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"Anxiety" in Heidegger's Being and Time: 
The Harbinger of Authenticity 
J .M. Magrini 
DePaul University 
ABSTRACT: Analyzing the fundamental ontology of Dasein in Martin Heidegger's 
Being and Time, this essay details the essential relationship between the mood of 
"anxiety" (Angst) and Dasein ' s authentic comportment to existence. Although a highly 
disturbing experience, anxiety holds the potential for enlightenment, as it opens Dasein 
to the fundamental characteristics of its temporal authenticity. Dasein assents to its 
Selfhood and enacts its freedom in a "resolute," authentic manner only when it grasps the 
difficult and burdensome aspects of life revealed by way of Angst's attunement. Thus, 
I argue that anxiety is the single most important mode of human attunement that 
Heidegger describes. 
This essay examines the relationship 
between the mood of anxiety (Angst) and 
Dasein's authentic comportment to 
existence. It will be shown that anxiety is 
a potentially enlightening experience, 
which brings Dasein before the most 
fundamental characteristics of authenticity, 
including Dasein's awareness of its own-
most potentiality-for-Being, which it 
projects while bearing the full weight of 
its primordial guilt, thereby owning up to 
the "nothingness" at the root of its Being, 
and further, facing the uttermost, insur-
mountable "certainty" of its possible 
non-existence, or death. As a far-reach-
ing primordial possibility of disclosure, 
anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its 
"Being towards its ownmost potentiality-
for-Being - that is , its Being}ree for the 
freedom of choosing itself and taking 
hold of itself' (Being and Time , 
232/188). To choose and take hold of 
oneself, as Heidegger conceives, is to 
assent to one's own most potentiality-for-
Being and exist in an authentic manner. 
This includes Being-in-the-world in such 
a way that one is beholden to the past 
and accountable for the future . 
For the most part, Dasein exists in 
an inauthentic manner (everydayness), 
which amounts to choosing not to choose 
itse(f, and is characterized by the perpet-
ual movement of falling. This mode of 
existence for Heidegger denotes "an 
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understanding in which the existent 
Dasein does not understand itself primar-
ily by that apprehended possibility of 
itself which is most peculiarly its own" 
(Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 
279). In the inauthentic mode, Dasein's 
understanding and discourse are expressed 
within the idle talk and curiosity of the 
"they-self," disclosing existence in a 
superficial and ambiguous manner. 
Tranquilized by what seems a complete 
understanding of things, Dasein never 
sets out to acquire an authentic under-
standing of existence and is unconcerned 
with the clear-sighted projection of its 
ownmost possibilities. Lost in the "they-
self," Dasein does not enact its own 
Being and either avoids, or remains 
oblivious to, the uniqueness and 
"peculiarity" of its Being and its genuine 
possibilities. 
This lack of authentic self-understanding 
is a problem for Heidegger, who is con-
cerned with bringing Dasein . back to 
itself to face its own Being with honesty 
and integrity. Asking how Dasein's own-
most potentiality-for-Being is to be 
grasped and enacted, Heidegger offers a 
solution that spans nearly the entirety of 
Division II of Being and Time. When 
Dasein exists authentically, he con-
cludes, "Dasein is itself in and from its 
own most peculiar possibility , a possibil-
ity that has been seized on and chosen by 
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the Dasein itself' (BP, 287). Authentic 
existence constitutes Dasein's most 
extreme possibility of existing, which 
primarily determines its Being. As 
opposed to moving along passively with 
the ebb and flow of things, Dasein, for 
the first time, is emphatically choosing to 
choose itself and its own way in the 
world. It is for this reason that Heidegger 
considers authentic existence an extreme 
possibility for Dasein. 1 However, before 
Dasein comports itself authentically, it 
must be brought back from falling and 
the "they-self' to instead face itself and 
the ultimate conditions of existence. This 
is accomplished by way of the revelatory 
mood (Stimmung) of anxiety, which for 
Heidegger represents the harbinger of 
authenticity. 
Moods are fundamental states of 
attunement that color Dasein 's disposition 
and awareness, out of which it uncovers, 
or discloses, things that matter. Prior to 
comporting itself to any situation, Dasein 
is already immersed within a mood of 
some kind, as attunement is always at 
work influencing its worldly orientation. 
Heidegger describes attunement as a pri-
mordial way of Being that precedes "all 
cognition and volition, and [is] beyond 
their range of disclosure" (BT, ] 75/136). 
However, not all moods are equally 
revealing. For example, everyday moods 
such as love, happiness, boredom, irri-
tability, and fear do not provide funda-
mental existential insight into Dasein' s 
Being as a whole, <l!ld instead reveal the 
world in a restricted and limited manner. 
Veiling more than they disclose, "every-
day moods" lead to a diminished aware-
ness. Therefore, instead of pressing forth 
into its possibilities in a lucid manner, 
Dasein responds inappropriately and 
inadequately to the situation at hand, as 
is the case when Dasein, in the mood of 
fear, "becomes unsure of everything else 
and completely loses [its] head."2 
Heidegger's task within Being and 
Time is to carry out what he defines as 
the "fundamental ontology" of Dasein. 
In order for the existential analytic to 
master its provisional task of exhibiting 
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Dasei n ' s Being, it must first locate the 
most far-reaching, primordial mode of 
attunement that effectively reveals 
Dasei n' s entire structural make-up. In 
quest of this primordial mode of disclo-
sure, Heidegger searches for the "right 
mood," that is, the mood that most effec-
tively brings to light the oppressive, 
disturbing character of existence, and for 
this reason examines anxiety (Angst) , 
a pri mordial state of Dasein' s attune-
ment. Anxiety reveals existence as a 
phenomenon that eludes all attempts to 
explain and control it, thus opening up 
the fundamental elements of Dasein' s 
existence, revealing its "world as world," 
bringing forth its most important and 
authentic possibilities in light of finitude. 
According to Heidegger, the funda-
mental mood of anxiety is the most 
rudimentary form of disclosure that 
attunes Dasein to its existence, more 
primordial and .revelatory than any 
other average everyday mood. Anxiety 
exposes Dasein to the fundamental 
nature of its Being-in-the-world by 
. bringing it before the great void of exis-
tence, and is therefore crucial to Dasein's 
authentic existential understanding of 
such phenomena as "death," "nothing-
ness," and "thrownness." This awareness 
then attunes Dasein as it enacts its 
authentic possibilities in the existentiell. 
In essence, anxiety is about "nothing-
ness," or the "nullity" that resides at the 
center of Dasein's Being. Heidegger 
views the issue of existential nothingness 
as a pressing philosophical concern, 
which is to be confronted and interrogated. 
The monumental significance of "nUllity" 
within Being and Time is evident when 
we come to understand that without the 
ultimate "anxious" encounter with the 
"nothing" of existence Dasein can nei-
ther legitimately approach the possibility 
of its Selfhood nor authentically enact its 
freedom. ' 
Anxiety is about death and guilt, 
awakening Dasein to the inherent 
instability and indefiniteness of its finite 
existence. However, anxiety is not a fear 
of a particular entity in the world. Rather, 
DIALOGUE 
anxiety is a generalized, highly disturb-
ing dread arising from Dasein, which 
induces a crisis of meaning. Anxiety 
provokes a shattering breakdown in the 
everyday, familiar ways in which Dasein 
conducts its life and most dramatically 
illustrates the principle of breakdown 
and revelation within Heidegger's 
philosophy. For example, in Division I, 
Section ill, Chapter 16 (Being and 
Time), Heidegger analyzes the break-
down of "ready-to-hand" equipment and 
the subsequent revelation of "world" 
through the phenomenon of the "un-
ready-to-hand." When a tool functions 
properly, its authentic "readiness-to-
hand" remains inconspicuous. On the 
contrary, when a tool ceases to function 
properly, or becomes unusable, it quickly 
draws the attention of the user to the 
system of relations of which it is a part 
as it is directed toward a specific task. At 
the instant of breakdown, Dasein catches 
sight of everything connected to the 
work; the totality of the "workshop," so 
to speak, is lit up. The nature of "equip-
mentality" and the referential totality of 
the "ready-to-hand" are simultaneously 
made explicit, disclosing the overall 
purpose of the project (towards-this) and 
the manner in which the project must 
proceed in order to reach fruition (il1-
.order-to). Anxiety induces a similar phe-
nomenon, albeit on a larger scale, for in 
the moment of Angst's attunement, the 
entirety of Dasein's existence is disrupted, 
its life no longer "works," or functions 
with meaning. A breakdown occurs, and 
the phenomenon of the world announces 
its presence, disclosing the complex 
system of reference relations within 
which Dasein is immersed. 
When the world announces its pres-
ence in anxiety, Dasein ' s everyday exis-
tence (inauthentic) falls into a state of 
confusion; meanings and interrelations 
are lost, and a slipping away of beings 
occurs. At the moment anxiety swells, 
Dasein no longer feels at home within 
the comfort and safety of its inauthentic 
Being-in-the-world, as the thoughts and 
interpretations of the "they-self' lose 
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meaning, force, and significance. Things 
that were once familiar and compre-
hendible show themselves in problematic 
ways. Dasein is momentarily "left 
hanging" as a homeless, thrown being. 
Alienated, in the mode of the "not-at-
home" (Unheimlichkeit), Dasein is forced 
before the "nothingness" of existence.4 
This primordial, " uncanny" existential 
mode of the "not-at-home" represents for 
Heidegger the most fundamental way of 
existence, acting to individualize Dasein 
for its own Being, revealing the unique, 
individual possibilities, which it alone 
has the potential to enact as Being-in-
the-world. 
However, the individualization (exis-
tential solipsism) that occurs in anxiety 
is the exact opposite of solipsism as tra-
ditionally conceived, i.e., as a retreat into 
the secluded interiority of the conscious-
ness, and is instead Dasein's bold 
reclaiming of its world and Being. 
Anxiety works on Dasein so as to bring it 
out of the world of the "they-self' to face 
its own "world as world, and thus bring 
it face to face with itself as Being-in-the-
world" (ST, 233/188). Anxiety frees 
Dasein to take hold of its existence by 
throwing it back upon that which it is 
most anxious about - its own potentiality-
for-Being-in-the-world provoking 
Dasein to reflect upon that which matters 
most in its existence. Heidegger claims 
that anxiety arises out of Being-in-the-
world as a whole, and when Dasein is 
anxious, its Being as "care" is disclosed. 
"Thus the entire phenomenon of anxiety 
shows Dasein as factically existing 
Being-in-the-world. The fundamental 
ontological characteristics of this entity 
are existentiality, facti city , and Being-
fallen" (ST, 2351191). 
The ontological understanding of care 
provides important insight into Dasein's 
existence, as the three modes (ecstases) 
of temporality are implicit within its 
definition as "ahead-of-itself-as-already-
in-the-world" and "Being-alongside" in 
the world.5 Heidegger views primordial 
temporality , the ontological meaning of 
the care-structure, as a finite phenomenon. 
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" Care itself, in its very essence," argues 
Heidegger, "is permeated with nullity 
(nothingness) through and through" (BT, 
331/285). Hence, due to the nature of its 
being, Dasein endures a finite existence 
and inevitably faces insurmountable 
obstacles, which restrict and shape its 
possibilities and the enactment thereof. It 
is anxiety that discloses the limitations of 
Dasein's existence by revealing the three 
ways in which "nothingness" manifests 
itself existentially within the care-struc-
ture: (1) Death (2) thrown ness and factic-
ity, and (3) the impossibi I ity of enacting 
all possibilities. These delimiting factors 
represent the primordial "nothingness" 
with which Dasein, enduring a finite 
existence, must come to terms in order to 
exist authentically. 
"The Nothing with which anxiety 
brings us face to face," writes Heidegger, 
"unveils the nullity by which Dasein, in 
its very basis, is defined; and this basis 
itself is as thrownness into death" (BT, 
356/308). Anxiety is about death. 
Inauthentic Dasein interprets death as if 
it were only a biological truism, signifying 
nothing more than the physical cessation 
of the organism. Falling within the 
everyday mode of existence, Dasein 
misses the existential significance of 
death and treats it as a present-at-hand 
thing or occurrence. For example, viewing 
death as an event that happens to others, 
or as a quasi-established, abstracted 
truth, which occurs at some point in 
Dasein's distant future, characterizes a 
"fleeing in the face 0f death," which is 
ultimately a fleeing from anxiety, 
described by Heidegger as a "fleeing of 
Dasein in the face of itself - of itself as 
an authentic potentiality-for-Being-
its-Self' (BT, 2291184). Living in an 
inauthentic way, in the midst of the 
"they-self," Dasein allows denial and 
deception to shield it from the pressing 
impact and monumental import of its 
mortality. Conversely, authentic Dasein 
interprets the oppressive void of -anxiety 
and the ultimate nothingness of death as 
the single most integral aspect of authentic 
comportment. When Dasein, uncanny 
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and individuated, with its worldly rela-
tions severed, is brought before the utter 
possibility of its no-Ionger-being-able-to-
be, its ownmost authentic potentiality-
for-Being is revealed as Being-towards-
death . It not only attunes itself to the 
inevitability of mortality, but also pro-
jects the "uncanniness" of anxiety into 
its futural existence. This, for Heidegger, 
represents the existential understanding 
of death as a "Being-certain of death," 
or mortality, and when Dasein takes on 
this possibi Iity as its own possibility, it 
is anticipating and "running ahead" 
(vorlaufen) towards or up to its death, 
with the dual recognition of its 
inevitability and indeterminate nature, as 
death, the uttermost possibility of non-
being, can occur at any moment. 
Dasein is free for the possibility of 
death when it accepts its mortality, and 
this is what Heidegger calls the "freedom 
towards death." At the moment Dasein is 
free for death, open for what is possible 
at any moment, all of its possibilities are 
subordinated to the uttermost possibility 
of death and thus become provisional. 
In its "running ahead" to death in antici-
pation, Dasein is liberated from its 
absorption in the "they" of everyday 
existence and understands its existence 
in terms of its factical possibilities, 
which are constrained and shaped by 
mortality. As Heidegger indicates, antici-
pation is something other than merely 
Being-certain of death's inevitability; 
more importantly, it is the freedom for 
possibilities within which Dasein holds 
and maintains itself. Being-certain for 
death is only disclosed when Dasein 
enacts the "not-yet" that is always a part 
of its "Being-ahead-of-itself." In antici-
pation, Dasein recognizes death as a con-
stant and legitimate threat arising from 
anxiety's latent presence, which holds 
Dasein open to "the utter and constant 
threat to itself arising from [its] ownmost 
individualized Being" (BT, 310/266). 
Thus, anticipation is also about anxiety, 
as "running ahead" to death is Dasein's 
authentic comportment to death and 
includes maintaining, or holding, oneself 
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within the threat of death ' s indefinite 
certainty. 
In Division II , Chapter I (Seing and 
Time) , Heidegger ends the discussion of 
death by explicating the ontological 
possibility of the existential projection 
of anticipation. The question remains. 
whether or not any phenomenon in 
Dasein's existence actually realizes this 
"ontological-existential" possibility of a 
Being-towards-death in the concrete, 
existentiell, i.e., "Dasein' s ability to 
come to owe anything in facti cally 
existing" (ST, 332/286). Heidegger demon-
strates that such a phenomenon exists 
and refers to it as the "conscience." 
When Dasein owns up to the primordial 
guilt of existence (nothingness), which 
conscience formalizes and "silently" 
communicates, it therefore fulfills the 
ontological conclusions about death and 
is free for the pursuit of its own finite 
possibilities within concrete existenfiell 
situations. 
Heidegger does not express con-
science in traditional psychological , ethi-
cal, or religious terms. Rather, he views 
conscience as a form of understanding, 
expressed as a silent voice which urges 
Dasein to end its flight into the inauthen-
tic world, i.e., face the "nothingness" of 
its Being as thrown-prqjection, own up 
to its primordial guilt, and assume the 
responsibility of enacting its authentic 
potentiality-for-Being. In vocalizing what 
anxiety intimates, conscience reminds 
Dasein that it does not control its own 
Being, as the C;lr-e-structure is ultimately 
grounded in primordial "nothingness." 
Since anxiety discloses this fact it is 
therefore integral to the phenomenon of 
conscience. "In uncanniness ," reminds 
Heidegger, "Dasein stands together with 
itself primordially. Uncanniness brings 
this entity face to face with its undis-
guised nullity, which belongs to the 
possibility of its own most potentiality-
for-Being" (BT, 333/287). Like facing 
death, the acceptance of guilt's burden 
requires Dasein to confront the disturb-
ing truths of existence brought to light in 
anxiety. 
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The reticent voice of conscience 
speaks from the depths of anxiety's rum-
bling silence. The summons of "Being-
guilty" is potentially audible because of 
Dasein's ontological predisposition for 
hearing: 
Only in keeping silent does the 
conscience call; that is to say, the 
call comes from the soundlessness 
of uncannniness, and the Dasein 
which it summons is called back into 
the stillness of itself, and called back 
as something that is to become still. 
Only in reticence, therefore, is 
this silent discourse understood 
appropriately in wanting to have a 
conscience. It takes the words away 
from the common-sense idle talk of 
the "they" (ST, 343/296). 
The uncanny call of Dasein (con-
science) in its thrown "nothingness" is 
unfamiliar to the ordinary, everyday 
Dasein and thus resonates as a distant, 
"alien" voice. The silent discourse of 
conscience rings in an unfamiliar and 
anomalous manner within the loud 
confusion of inauthentic existence. For 
this reason, the voice penetrates the crash 
and rattle of idle chatter and reaches the 
"they-self," attempting to induce 
Dasein 's authentic "Self' to pay heed to 
its message and return "into the reticence 
(~f [its] existent potentiality-for-Being" 
(BT, 322/277). However, to merely 
have the voice of conscience reach the 
inauthentic Dasein is not sufficient to 
call it back from the "they" into its 
existent potentiality-for-Being. For the 
possibility exists that Dasein, absorbed 
within its fallen everyday existence, may 
ignore the call , fail to understand it, or 
remain oblivious to its urgent communi-
cations. Hence, just as there exists an 
inauthentic reaction to death, there exists 
an inauthentic response to conscience. 
Heidegger states that as Dasein runs 
from its primordial guilty nature, it is 
again fleeing the oppression of anxiety, 
and in this instance it is "fleeing in the 
face of the conscience." 
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Heidegger argues that guilt, in the 
everyday sense, emerges when Dasein 
endeavors to cover over, or flee from, the 
agitation it experiences by way of Angst. 
Attempting to quell its unsettledness, 
Dasein passively adopts the ethical 
mores of the "they-self" as rigid criteria 
for its behavior. When the voice of the 
"they-self' is erroneously protracted and 
universalized, it forms that which 
Heidegger refers to as the "world 
conscience." To envisage the conscience 
as an objective, formalized phenomenon, 
with content supplied by the venerable 
obligation to religious beliefs, principles 
of reason, or societal mores, is to 
respond in an inauthentic manner to the 
call of the existential conscience. 
Although the voice of the conscience is 
the call of care (Dasein's own call), inau-
thentic Dasein judges the caller "after the 
manner of the world," i.e., the collective 
voice of the "they-self," and interprets 
conscience as a power that it can "come 
across Objectively" (BT, 323/278). 
Heidegger contends that the traditional 
conception of conscience and guilt, as 
expressed within psychology and 
religion, for example, originate from the 
misunderstanding of the existential 
conSClence. 
Unlike the everyday idea of guilt, 
existential guilt is a form of obligation 
characterized by an emptiness, a lack of 
content, which Heidegger expresses in 
the following terms: "Being-the-basis for 
a being that is defined by a 'not' - that is 
to say, as Being-the-c2sis of a nullity" 
(BT, 329/283). Dasein is guilty because 
its possibilities for the future , past, and 
present are all influenced and constrained 
by the primordial "nothingness" that 
resides in the care-structure. To enact its 
authentic existence, Dasein must own up 
to its guilt. It must acknowledge and 
accept that the possibilities that it seeks 
to project itself upon are limited by 
"nothingness," which manifests itself in 
thrown-Being, death, and the fact that in 
choosing one possibility it is therefore 
precluding a host of other equally viable 
options. "Freedom," writes Heidegger, 
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"is only in the choice of one possibility -
that is, in tolerating one's not having 
chosen the others and one's not being 
able to choose them" (BT, 331/285). 
It has been the aim of this work to 
analyze anxiety as the harbinger of 
authenticity, but as a neutral mode of 
attunement, Angst is the forerunner to 
both Dasein' s authentic and inauthentic 
modes of comportment. Thus, to merely 
stand courageously before anxiety does 
not amount to "choosing" an authentic 
existence based on what anxiety reveals, 
for Angst "merely brings one into the 
mood for a possible resolution" (BT, 
394/344). If anxiety is to be considered 
and acknowledged as the harbinger of 
authenticity, an active move in which 
Dasein chooses to choose itse(f is 
required (recall the contrast between 
Dasein ' s authentic choosing to choose 
itse(f and the inauthentic choosing not to 
choose itse(f). Dasein must therefore 
incorporate the insight gained in anxiety 
and actively take on the responsibility of 
its death and the guilt-ridden "nothing-
ness" of its existence. Heidegger locates 
the means by which to open Dasein to 
the enactment of its authentic potentiality-
for-Being within the phenomenon of 
"resoluteness" (Entschlossenheit), which 
is to say, positively incorporating 
anxiety's seemingly negative influence: 
lA]nxiety can mount authentically 
only in a Dasein which is resolute. 
He who is resolute knows no fear; 
but he understands the possibility of 
anxiety as the possibility of the very 
mood which neither inhibits nor 
bewilders him. Anxiety liberates 
him .from possibilities which "count 
for nothing", and lets him become 
free for those which are authentic 
(BT,394/344). 
To initiate authentic Being-in-the-
world, a transformation of inauthentic 
existence is required. Dasein must submit 
to the . disturbing revelations of anxiety 
by way of "wanting-to-have-a-conscience," 
i.e., choosing to own up to its being-the-
DIALOGUE 
basis of a nullity as thrown-projection. 
This blameworthy attitude, or authentic 
hearing of the call of conscience, is 
Dasein's ownmost Self taking action "in 
itself on its own accord in its Being-
guilty, and represents phenomenally that 
authentic potentiality-for-Being which 
Dasein itself attests" (RT, 342/295). The 
authentic understanding of conscience, 
which signifies a readiness for anxiety, is 
what Heidegger terms "resoluteness," 
which is the authentic "disclosedness" 
of Dasein. This distinctive mode of 
"disclosedness" holds within itself 
Dasein's authentic Being-towards-death 
"as the possible existential modality for 
its own authenticity," which it enacts in 
the existentiell (RT, 353/305). Heidegger 
links resoluteness, as disclosedness, or 
"uncovering," to the authentic truth 
(aletheia) of existence, "the most primor-
dial, and indeed the most authentic 
disclosedness," in which Dasein is its 
potentiality-for-Being (RT, 264/221). 
In the moment of resolute openness, 
which is nothing other than wanting to 
have a conscience, throwing itself down 
upon its Being-guilty in readiness for 
anxiety, Dasein opens itself to what 
Heidegger terms the "Situation," or the 
authentic way of "Being-there" (RT, 
347/300). As previously stated, Dasein's 
authentic existence represents an 
emphatic "choosing to choose" itself. 
However, to understand Heidegger's 
conception of Dasein in the moment of 
resoluteness, the traditional notion of 
volition as the "deliberate choice of a 
subject" must be reconsidered. (, This is 
because resolute Dasein is not willfully 
choosing between the competing 
alternatives of inauthentic and authentic 
existence. Rather, Dasein is opening 
itself up to Being; its "choice," so to 
speak., is already made when it allows 
itself to be called by conscience to own 
up to guilt and accept the "nothingness" 
of existence. Therefore, Dasein is not so 
much "choosing" authenticity and the 
Situation as it is choosing its actions 
within specific situations. In resolute-
ness, Dasein, released from the oppressive 
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influence of the "they-self," pushes for-
ward authentically into its possibilities 
with the existential understanding of 
what is factically possible at each and 
every moment. 7 
The authentic Situation of Dasein is 
not an axiomatic guide to authentic 
behavior, presenting a theoretical schema 
for human existence. Instead, it is an 
authentic way of inhabiting the present 
moment, which modifies and clarifies 
Dasein ' s relationships, i.e., its concerned 
dealings with entities and its solicitous 
Being-with-Others. The Situation is the 
authentic clearing of Being, an opening 
for the enactment of Dasein's authenti-
cally owned possibilities. Seizing upon 
the existential understanding of thrown-
ness and death, Dasein makes its choices 
in light of its uncertain future and 
thrown-past. It is within the Situation 
that Dasein' s freedom is born of the 
relationship between its choices and the 
constraints that shape its possibilities. To 
erroneously conceive resoluteness as a 
deliberate choice, which estab1ishes the 
permanent transformation of Dasein, is 
to truncate freedom and eradicate the 
possibility of ethics, and thus deny to 
existence "nothing less than the very 
possibility of taking action in a particular 
Situation" (RT, 345/298). 
When "resolute" Dasein comports 
itself, anxiety has extinguished intrinsic 
meaning from its life, and the reasons for 
acting and making choices hinge upon 
the "disclosive projection and determina-
tion of what is factically possible at the 
time" (RT, 345/298). Authenticity does 
not provide life with a new content, for 
authentic existence is in fact devoid of 
content, nor does it alienate Dasein from 
the world. Rather, authenticity "brings 
the Self right into its current concernful 
being alongside what is ready-to-hand, 
and pushes it into solicitous Being-with-
others" (RT, 344/298). Authenticity is 
a shift in the framework of Dasein' s 
existence, transforming the "context" in 
which it enacts its approaching possibilities. 
Authentic Being-in-the-world is a spon-
taneous way of living in which Dasein is 
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open and receptive to the approach of 
Being. The radical, authentic transforma-
tion to authenticity occurs when Dasein 
owns up to the disclosed "nothingness," 
or nullity, of its Being, which first 
manifests itself through the primordial 
attunement of Angst. 
Conceived as a temporal phenome-
non, the Situation is Dasein ' s "moment 
of vision" (Augenblick) , or "instant," of 
authenticity. "In the instant as an ecstasis," 
writes Heidegger, " the existent Dasein is 
carried away, as resolved, into the facti-
cally determined possibilities, circum-
stances, contingencies of the situation of 
action" (BP, 287). This is the moment of 
enpresenting (the authentic "present" of 
ecstatic temporality) when Dasein, acces-
sible and free, projects itself into its 
possibilities within the factical and 
distinct circumstances of its own unique 
life. Such an authentic "resolute" open-
ness to worldly encounters is only 
possible because Dasein is a temporal 
being that temporalizes, and thus is at 
once its future, past, and present as 
thrown-projecting Being-in-the-world. The 
present, which is held within authentic 
temporality , is the sustaining form of 
Dasein's authentic choices, the "resolute 
rapture with which Dasein is carried 
away to whatever possibilities and cir-
cumstances are encountered in the 
Situation as possible objects of concern" 
(BP, 287). 
The authentic temporalizing of Dasein 
occurs as it projects its finite possibili-
ties , initiating a forward movement 
towards itself as resolute Being-towards-
death in its ownmost potentiality-for-
Being. This movement secures a "repeti-
tion" of the authentic nullity, or 
"nothingness," characterizing Dasein' s 
authentic response to the call of con-
science. Thrown before the revelations of 
anxiety, this future-oriented act of 
retrieval is the authentic appropriation of 
Dasein's "having-been." In coming to 
itself (future) from out of its own 
thrown-Being (past), Dasein discloses 
the meaning of authentic Being within 
the "instant," or enpresenting (present), 
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of the Situation. This "ecstatic" temporal 
process represents the letting be of 
Being, which has been defined as the 
authentic truth of existence. Thus, when 
Dasein exists authentically, it experi-
ences the world in its basic "unconceal-
ment" - allowing that which shows itse(f 
from itse(f to be seen - now not disclos-
ing beings, but the phenomenon of world 
as such, i.e., the overarching matrix of 
meaning and purpose structuring 
Dasein's Being-in-the-world. 
The concluding remarks focus on 
Dasein's authentic response to anxiety as 
an insightful and philosophical way to 
encounter Angst. The ultimate situations 
of human existence, which manifest 
themselves by way of anxiety, represent 
the very conditions that hold the 
potential to make human life genuinely 
meaningful. Death , nothingness, and 
thrown ness, disclosed through anxiety, 
are precisely what Dasein must accept in 
order to exist authentically as its future 
(free-for-death), past and inheritance 
(its having-been), and present, the 
"there," or enpresenting, of existence. It 
is of benefit, at this point, to inquire into 
the mind-set of the authentic, resolute 
Dasein as perceived by Heidegger. Is it 
likely that while preparing his extensive 
analysis of authenticity, Heidegger was 
drawing inspiration from his own exis-
tence as a philosopher? Such an assumption 
is reasonable, if we envisage the philoso-
pher as one who is attuned and open to 
life's most difficult situations. 
Of assistance in understanding the 
philosopher's mind-set is to recall the 
two perspectives from which this essay 
has considered anxiety 'S influence. If, on 
the one hand, Angst is interpreted in an 
inauthentic manner, as a constant threat 
to one's healthful existence, Dasein flees 
in fear from anxiety's disturbing effects 
to the safety and familiarity of the 
interpretations of the status quo. If, on 
the other hand, Angst is perceived as the 
bridge to a unique form of understanding, 
which connects Dasein to the finite realities 
of its Being-in-the-world, then as opposed 
to prefiguring horror and passivity, anxiety 
DIALOGUE 
announces itself as the harbinger of 
Dasein ' s authentic enactment of free-
dom for its possibilities. As anxiety is 
disclosing the insignificance of the world, 
authentic Dasein is reinterpreting the 
meaninglessness and impossibility of 
existence as revelatory. This radical 
conversion of the inauthentic view 
"signifies that one is letting the possibility 
of an authentic potentiality-for-Being be 
lit up," i.e., one is behaving philosophi-
cally, awakened by the sense of wonder 
(BT,393/343) . 
The philosopher therefore embraces, 
through resolute openness, the limited 
and ephemeral nature of the world that 
anxiety discloses. To abandon the notion 
of a finite worldly existence in search of 
meaningful consolation elsewhere (e.g., 
inauthentic worldly projection or other-
worldly projection by way of religion) is 
to degrade our vast potential, as such 
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incoherent aspirations work to tear down 
our genuine earthly relations. Philosophy 
is ultimately concerned with enacting 
ways of life that embrace finitude , for 
"existence is truly philosophical only 
when its knowledge is appropriately 
attuned to that which cannot be known, 
to a destiny that exceeds oneself."R 
Philosophy must take up and challenge 
the ultimate uncertainties that comprise 
Being-in-the-world. Heidegger accurately 
concludes that outside of the single fatality 
of death, that uttermost certainty, which 
is non-relational and insurmountable, Dasein 
is a wealth of potential. Considering the 
depth and breadth of his treatment of 
authenticity, Heidegger may well be asking 
the reader of Being and Time to consider 
seriously the life of the philosopher as 
representing an "anxious" obligation to 
death, which frees herlhim for the joyous 
and challenging activity of living. * 
* I thank Professor William McNeiII , author of The Glance of the Eye: Heidegger, 
Aristotle, and the Ends of Theory. His comments and suggestions helped to improve 
this essay. 
Notes 
1 Heidegger, Martin, The Concept oj Time. Trans., W. McNeill, bilingual edition (Blackwell: 
Oxford), L992, p. IOE. Heidegger's exact quotation concerning Dasein 's authenticity runs thus: "The 
authenticity oj Dasein is what constitutes its most extreme possibility of Being. Da<;ein is primarily 
determined by this most extreme possibility of Dasein." 
2 , "What is Metaphysics?" Basic Writings. Trans. , David Farrell Krell. (Harper & 
Row: San Francisco), 1993, p. 100. "Because fear possesses [the] trait of being 'fear in the face of 
and ' fear for,' he who fears and is afraid is captive to the mood in which he finds himself. Striving 
to rescue himself from this particular thing, he becomes unsure of everything else and completely 
'loses his head' ." 
3 , "What is Metaphysics?" Basic Writings. Trans. , David Farrell Krell. (Harper & 
Row: San Francisco), 1993, p. ]03. The monumental importance that Heidegger attaches to the Nothing 
within his philosophy is expressed directly within the following statement: "Without the original revela-
tion of the Nothing, no self-hood and no freedom." 
4 "Unheirnlichkeit" translates as "uncanny" but means more literally "un-homelike," or "not-
at-home" (fin. H. 188). 
5 , The Concept oj Time. Trans. , W. McNeill , bilingual edition (Blackwell: Oxford), 
1992, p. 20B. To understand Dasein and further, Being in general, Heidegger argues that we must first 
understand time, for Dasein is temporality. "Dasein is time, time is temporal. Dasein is not time, but 
temporality." 
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6 , "On the Origin of the Work of Art," Poetry, Language, Thought. Trans., 
A. Hofstadter (Harper & Row: New York), 1971, p. 67. Reflecting on the phenomenon of authentic 
"resoluteness" within "The Origin of the Work of Art," Heidegger writes the following: "The 
resoluteness intended in Being and Time, is not the deliberate choice of a subject, but the opening 
up of human being, out of its capacity in that which is, to the openness of being." 
7 Heidegger describes the immediacy of Dasein 's action-taking when resolute for its own 
Potentiality-for-Being in the following terms: "Resoluteness does not take cognizance of a 
Situation and put that Situation before itself; it has put itself into the Situation already. As resolute, 
Dasein is already taking action." (BT, 347/300). 
8 McNeill, William, "Care for the Self," Philosophy Today (Spring Issue), p. 62. 
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